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Section 1: Introduction 
 
In 1979 public enterprises in the UK accounted for 8% of employment, 10% of output and 16% of 
total gross domestic fixed capital formation1. By 1992 the comparable figures were 3% of 
employment, 3% of output and 5% of gross domestic fixed capital formation.2 During the 
Conservative administrations of Margaret Thatcher (1979-90) and John Major (1990-97) large scale 
privatisations of many of these enterprises took place. By 1998 only a few public enterprises 
remained, most notably the Post Office, London Underground and BNFL - the nuclear fuels and 
reprocessing company. The Post Office, London Underground and BNFL have each been the subject 
of proposals for privatisation3. While all of the major privatisations of telecoms, gas, water, 
electricity and railways were opposed by the Labour opposition at the time, the incoming Labour 
government of Tony Blair has no plans to reverse these privatisations and indeed has continued with 
feasibility studies of privatisation of remaining state-owned enterprises. 
 
The government policy of enterprise privatisation is more properly described as liberalisation - the 
introduction of market incentives into industries where state ownership and/or legislation had limited 
private ownership and new entry. Liberalisation often consists of the interrelated policies of 
ownership transfer (conventionally defined privatisation), structural change to the industries 
concerned and the introduction of statutory regulatory bodies to oversee the behaviour of incumbent 
firms. Coupled with policies of liberalisation towards public enterprises the government undertook 
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the mass sale of council houses, the deregulation of many professional services markets (e.g. law and 
accountancy firms etc.), the contracting out of many government services (eg. refuse collection), 
private provision of services (eg. nursing homes), public-private partnerships in investment projects 
(eg. in inner-city areas), reducing subsidies for services (eg. dental care and opticians) and recent 
attempts to introduce quasi-markets within the state education and health sectors (see Young, 1986). 
 
In this paper we survey the process of liberalisation of public enterprises in the UK since 1979. We 
do this because this is arguably the most notable of the UK’s recent deregulation processes and is 
certainly the one aspect of the recent Conservative administrations policies that has attracted the 
most international attention. While the UK was not the first to undertake large-scale privatisation 
(Chile had a significant programme in the late 1970s), it seems to have been the most widespread and 
advanced of any in an OECD country. In terms of the extent and likely impact of the programme only 
the recent mass privatisations in transition economies seem more significant. 
 
In what follows we begin by reviewing the history and genesis of the privatisation programme in 
Section 2. In section 3 we focus on the development of the regulatory systems designed for the 
telecoms, gas, water, airports, electricity and rail sectors. In section 4 we analyze the evidence on the 
effects of the economic effects of the privatisations. Section 5 offers a conclusion. 
 
Section 2: The UK privatisation programme 
 
Table 1 shows a list of the main privatisations in the UK since 1979. The time line highlights a 
number of features. The privatisations can be characterised according to the administration under 
which they occurred. During the first Conservative administration 1979-83, only companies which 
were already listed on the stock exchange (eg. British Petroleum) or which operated in competitive 
markets were privatised (Amersham and Associated British Ports) were sold off. It was during the 
second administration 1983-87 that the privatisation of major utilities began with the privatisation of 
British Telecom (BT) in 1984, then the world’s largest public offer for sale and British Gas (1986). 
The third Conservative administration 1987-92 saw the privatisation of the water and electricity 
industries, the privatisation of electricity involving horizontal and vertical separation of state owned 
companies and the creation of a power pool. The fourth Conservative administration 1992-97 
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involved the privatisation of companies previously thought to be unsaleable: British Coal, British 
Energy (which owns the newer nuclear power plants) and the Rail Industry. 
 
2.1 The rationale for privatisation 
 
The UK economy was in considerable disarray in 1979. The oil shock of 1973-74 had been followed 
by a period high unemployment, high inflation and low GDP and productivity growth. UK industry 
was increasingly lagging behind the productivity levels of comparator industrial countries. This 
seemed to be particularly true of industries in the public sector (see Pryke, 1981). 
 
Marsh (1991) and Moore (1992) identify a number of reasons behind the government’s privatisation 
programme: 
 
1. Reducing government involvement in industry. For many conservatives this was an ideological 
aim of privatisation. Socialism involved ownership of the means of production and control of the 
‘commanding heights’ of the economy. Until recently the Labour Party’s ‘Clause 4’ asserted its 
commitment to nationalisation. Mrs Thatcher saw privatisation as a means by which she could 
destroy Socialism4. In economic terms we can interpret this aim as one of increasing the cost of 
government interference of in the day-to-day management of the economy (Perotti, 1995). 
Indeed Labour abandoned ‘Clause 4’ in March 1995 and dropped its plan to renationalise 
Railtrack, the rail infrastructure company, on the grounds of cost in October 19975. At a more 
basic level privatisation removes companies from being forced to compete for scarce public funds 
in order to undertake investment projects. 
 
2. Increasing efficiency. State owned enterprises were seen to be inefficient in 1979. Millward 
(1990) reports that productivity growth in terms of output per head 1951-73 was 3%p.a. in 
private manufacturing and 2.7%p.a. in public enterprises, while from 1973-85 the figures were 
2.3% and 2.1% respectively. By comparison to the US, output per head in 1982 in the US 
railways was 4 times that in the UK, US coal 9 times more efficient and US electricity and gas 
3.5 times higher compared with an average of 2.8 times higher for the whole of manufacturing. 
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While total factor productivity comparisons show public enterprise doing slightly better than the 
rest of manufacturing and closing the gap with the US over the post war period, it is still the case 
that relative and trend productivity were poor in UK public enterprise at the beginning of the 
1980s. There was clearly a lot of potential for increased productivity especially if US style 
management techniques could be introduced. It is interesting to note that much of the electricity 
distribution industry and parts of the rail industry have been purchased by US companies 
following privatisation. 
 
3. Reducing the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR). A striking consequence of UK 
privatisation was the huge revenues raised from asset sales (see Table 1). Privatisation revenue 
was equal to around 1-2%p.a. of GDP from 1984 to 19946. These revenues were particularly 
significant in the late 1980s as the large privatisations of Telecoms, Gas and Water were 
undertaken. Additionally privatisations reduced the PSBR by increasing the corporate taxes paid 
by privatised companies and by removing their borrowing from the public sector. NERA (1996, 
p.29) found that a sample of 33 privatised companies (representing 75% of total privatisation 
proceeds)  who in 1981-2 had cost the public sector £107m contributed in 1994-5 £8.4bn to the 
public sector, of which £2.6bn was corporation tax, £2.1bn debt repayment and £3.3bn asset 
sales proceeds. The reduced claim on the public sector was very influential in the privatisation of 
the water industry (Foster, 1992) where compliance with European Union water and sewerage 
directives was anticipated to require huge investments by the water companies. 
 
4. Curbing public sector union power. Public sector enterprise unions were extremely powerful. 
Rail workers, electricity and coal workers were all capable of inflicting severe political and 
economic damage. Coal miners were credited with bringing down the Conservative government 
in 19747. While the government’s main method of reducing union power was via Trade Union 
legislation, privatisation was a contributor to sharply reduced union power. Privatisation reduced 
union power via the redundancies which followed privatisation, the contracting out of services 
associated with privatisation and via fragmenting industries so that coordinated action has 
become more difficult (e.g. in the rail industry where the number of companies increased from 
one to over 100). The fragmentation of industries has been accompanied by a decline in national 
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wage bargaining, increased personal contracts and localisation of disputes especially given 
legislation outlawing secondary action (Brown et al., 1997). 
 
5. Wider share ownership and employee share ownership. The number of individual shareholders 
has increased sharply since 1979 as a result of privatisation. Nigel Lawson (1992, p.210) reports 
that it was by accident that the government discovered the popularity of selling the shares at a 
discount to the public to encourage mass participation in the sale, when it substantially 
underpriced the public offer for Amersham International in 1982. This coupled with the need to 
ensure the successful sale of British Telecom (BT) in 1984 encouraged the government to mount 
large advertising campaigns to direct market the sale to individuals. The most famous of these 
was the ‘Sid’ campaign for British Gas which featured the catch phrase ‘If you see Sid tell him’ 
which highlighted the populist appeal of privatisation. The government combined preferential 
sales prices with staged payments, loyalty share bonuses for those who held on to the shares for 3 
years and discounts on utility bills. The result of these financial incentives was to be huge public 
over-subscription and limited individual allocations for all of the post-1984 privatisations leaving 
institutions scrambling for shares at substantial first day premiums. Buckland (1987) however 
concluded that many investors subsequently sold their shares and of the continuing individual 
shareholders, few hold more shares in more than one privatised company. The result of this is 
that there has been no interruption in the long run trend towards increased institutional share 
ownership8. Employees benefited via free shares and larger allowed allocations of shares. 
 
6. Gaining political advantage. The political history of privatisation can be traced through the 
memoirs of Margaret Thatcher (1993), Nigel Lawson (1992), Peter Walker (1991) and Cecil 
Parkinson (1992), who were the principal politicians involved. While no mention was made of 
privatisation in the 1979 Conservative Manifesto, Geoffrey Howe, the first chancellor of the 
exchequer did make reference to asset sales in 1979. However Margaret Thatcher reports that 
economic recession prevented much progress beyond selling government stakes in listed 
companies in her first administration. It was during the 1983-87 administration that the 
programme of privatisation was developed. Lawson had supervised the asset sales in the first 
administration as Chief Secretary to the Treasury and then as Energy Minister had been 
responsible for privatising Amersham International and Britoil. As then Chancellor he 
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enthusiastically promoted privatisation. Cecil Parkinson and Norman Tebbit handled the 
privatisation of British Telecom which turned out to be enormously popular. Peter Walker was 
responsible for the ‘Sid’ campaign surrounding British Gas. The popularity of the programme 
was widely trailed by the Conservatives in the run-up to their re-election in 1987. Indeed 
McAllister and Studlar (1989) found that even adjusting for class and education there was a 
significant impact of privatisation and council house sales on voting patterns. The 1987 election 
victory was then followed by water privatisation and then the complex electricity privatisation. 
John Wakeham impressively prepared the electricity industry for privatisation in less than a year 
(see Henney, 1994). 
 
2.2 Criticism of government’s programme 
 
Although privatisation has been hailed as a great success in the UK it was not without its critics 
during the programme. Doubts were raised about the rationale behind the government’s policy (see 
Kay and Thompson, 1986): 
 
1. Privatisation and managerial discretion. Privatisation involved introducing private sector 
pressures on senior management in the public sector. As such it was not likely to be popular with 
these managers who were likely to slow down the process or interfere with it so as to improve 
the outcome for them at the expense of wider economic efficiency. The government was working 
to tight legislative programme and hence early privatisations involved compromising market 
structure in return for management cooperation. Button and Weyman-Jones (1994) note that this 
is the inevitable consequence of the structure of the game being played by the government and 
the management. This was particularly true in British Gas where the then chairman initially 
opposed the privatisation, but then enthusiastically supported it when it became clear that British 
Gas would be privatised as a monopoly supplier of gas in the UK. Similarly initial opposition 
from the chairman of the CEGB delayed the restructuring and privatisation of electricity 
generation and  transmission in England and Wales. Yarrow (1989) argued that early 
privatisations of BT and British Gas simply replaced political discretion in the running  of 
enterprises by managerial discretion for no measurable benefit in performance in the immediate 
post-privatisation period. 
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2. Privatisation and the PSBR. Some of the aims of privatisation cited in section 2.1 above are 
clearly contradictory. In particular the desire to increase efficiency and the desire to raise 
revenue. Clearly the government maximises asset sales by privatising a monopoly rather than a 
restructured industry. The privatisation of BT involved the vetoing of plans to break-up BT by 
the Treasury. Furthermore it seems to be the case that some privatisations actually worsened the 
long-run PSBR because the loss of the profit stream from the government’s net revenue was not 
compensated by dividends and increased tax revenue9. 
 
3. Privatisation and competition. Kay and Thompson argue strongly that it is competition that 
drives down prices and costs in the private sector not ownership per se. This seems to be borne 
out by comparisons between private and publicly owned firms in regulated markets such as 
electricity in the US, where there is no significant difference in costs between the different forms 
of ownership (see Pollitt, 95). In the case of potentially competitive industries it may be argued 
that privatisation is the only way to introduce effective competition, in the case of natural 
monopolies this argument does not hold. This leads to the question of why privatise natural 
monopolies such as water companies, gas and electricity transmission and distribution networks? 
In such cases privatisation will only lead to regulatory problems, monopoly prices and wasted 
investment. 
 
4. Privatisation, politics and shareownership.  Some have argued that privatisation was not a 
popular policy, Crewe (1988) cites contemporary opinion polls which consistently showed that a 
majority thought that particular privatisations were a bad idea (56% in the case of BT, 57% 
British Gas and 72% electricity and water). Worcester (1994) questions the success of the wider 
share-ownership policy which did not have as much impact as council house sales on voting 
patterns. Worcester suggests that privatisation has modified the culture of shareholding in the UK 
but has hardly impacted on public behaviour towards the stock market. We might therefore 
conclude that if discounting the share price was the price of wider share ownership it has not 
been a price worth paying, given the significant (inequitable) transfer of revenue from taxpayers 
to shareholders involved10. 
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2.3 Privatisation in context 
 
We conclude this section by attempting to highlight the wider context in which the government’s 
privatisation programme was proceeding. We highlight two of these, the impact of privatisation on 
industrial relations in the UK and the world wide trend towards privatisation. 
 
Oulton (1995) concludes that improved industrial relations and educational attainment levels in the 
UK are the supply side policy successes of the recent Conservative government. The Conservative 
Party of 1979 clearly identified Trade Union (TU) power as part of the UK’s underlying malaise11. 
The contribution of privatisation to achieving this goal was undoubtedly significant (see Colling and 
Ferner, 1995). Before 1979 change within the public sector could not be achieved without the 
consent of the unions, after privatisation management have been able to adopt a much more 
aggressive stance towards change. In the electricity industry national wage bargaining broke up after 
privatisation, derecognition occurred in subsidiary companies, TUs took an advisory role, managers 
have been put on individual contracts and formally excluded from collective agreements and 
companies have communicated directly with employees, not through unions. Litwin et al. (1996) give 
accounts of the widespread reorganisation of working practices surrounding privatisation in British 
Airways and PowerGen (an electricity generation company) that has allowed large scale reductions in 
staff numbers. Some of these changes may have occurred anyway due to technological changes but 
privatisation has increased customer orientation, team working, personal targets and bonuses and 
contracting out of much manual work. Colling and Ferner conclude however that privatisation’s 
impact per se on industrial relations is unclear. Arguably differing degrees of managerial skill among 
the companies have allowed some companies to make better use than others of the opportunities for 
reorganisation and the introduction of modern human resource management and training. 
 
The World Bank (1995) surveys the worldwide trend towards privatisation which has been observed 
since the late 1970s. They highlight the huge scale of the transfer of assets involved and the 
enormous potential for such liberalisation in developing countries with high initial percentages of 
productive assets owned by the state. Their survey of developing countries identifies three aspects of 
a successful privatisation programme. First, the programme must be politically desirable in the sense 
that the political leadership must see benefits for itself and its own constituents. Second, the 
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programme must be politically feasible in terms of the leadership having the power to enact reform 
and overcome opposition. Third, there must be political credibility such that losers will be 
compensated and investors’ property rights safeguarded. In terms of the UK all of these aspects were 
satisfied: Conservative voters would benefit disproportionally from privatisation and the 
Conservative administration had sufficient parliamentary support to push through the programme. 
The programme only faltered when in November 1994, with a small parliamentary majority and 
divided party, the government was defeated on proposals to privatise the Post Office12. Finally, it was 
able to compensate most of the early losers - there were very few compulsory redundancies and 
generous early retirement and there were voluntary severance packages for those who left privatised 
firms as they downsized. It took a Labour government to attempt an expropriation of shareholder 
returns from the privatisation with the a windfall tax on the profits of privatised utilities following 
their election in 1997. 
 
Section 3: The Development of the Regulatory System 
 
3.1 The origin of regulatory system for privatised monopolies 
 
The early privatisations following 1979 posed few competition problems. However with the 
privatisation of British Telecom the government had a problem of how  to regulate a firm with a 
significant amount of monopoly power and which provided an important service. The problem of 
regulating utilities is not new (as Newbery, 1998 describes). Indeed the emergence of significant 
public ownership in gas, electricity and water can be traced to the need to control the prices charged 
by incumbent firms without allowing excessive duplication of assets which were subject to large 
economies of scale. 
 
Faced with the privatisation of British Telecom and other utilities the government had a number of 
choices suggested to it in a report by Stephen Littlechild (1983): 
 
1.  Rate of return regulation. This method was extensively used in the United States and involves 
regulating the profits of utilities on the basis of an allowed rate of return on their capital assets. 
The advantage of this system is that it is easy to administer and enforce and provides 
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transparency. It actually operates via a quasi-judicial process where regulated companies or their 
customers may apply for changes in prices on the grounds of a change to the rate of return on the 
companies assets. The major problem with this method of regulation is the perverse incentives 
that it gives companies, both to increase their capital assets (rate base) and not to seek cost 
reductions (the Averch-Johnson effect)13. 
 
2.  The output related profits levy. This method was suggested by Sir Alan Walters, Mrs Thatcher’s 
chief economic adviser. It involves having a profit tax system for utilities where the tax rate 
declines as output rises. In theory this could encourage the regulated firm to produce more 
output than under a constant tax rate in order to maximise its profits. 
 
3.  A local tariff reduction scheme or RPI-X. This method was proposed by Littlechild and involved 
setting a maximum price for local telephone calls which would then be increased over a period by 
the rate of inflation (RPI) minus some X factor which might reflect expectations about the size of 
likely future productivity growth. The advantage over the other two methods was that it 
combined simplicity with incentives to minimise costs within the firm. 
 
The government accepted the RPI-X proposal and set up a regulatory agency or independent 
government department (The Office of Telecommunications, OFTEL) to oversee the regulation of 
the prices and  the service provided by British Telecom. OFTEL was headed by a Director General of 
Telecommunications with statutory powers and duties independent from the government. The 
restructuring of the industry required each telecommunications provider to have a license to operate 
in the telecommunications market. RPI-X price control is part of the license conditions for British 
Telecom. This pattern of RPI-X, licensing and a regulatory agency headed by a Director General 
with statutory powers was followed in gas, airports, water, electricity and rail. The system has been 
evolving, but has provided transparency in regulation and the freedom for each regulator to focus on 
the regulatory issues particular to his or her industry.  
 
Initially it was envisaged  that  RPI-X regulation in telecoms could be ‘regulation with a light hand’, 
which would simply prevent excessive exploitation of monopoly power until competition caused 
regulation to be unnecessary. At the same time as licensing BT, the government licensed a 
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competitor, Mercury, which would also be able to connect customers, develop its own trunk network 
and have access to BT’s local networks. The idea was that as competition developed between these 
two and between alternative technologies for voice telephony the need for OFTEL would disappear. 
Indeed one of the statutory duties of the telecoms regulator is to promote competition. Subsequent 
privatisations however recognised from the beginning that competition is likely to be limited for the 
foreseeable future, so that the statutory duty of the water regulator is only to ‘facilitate’ competition 
in the limited instances where it might be possible. 
 
3.2 The evolution of RPI-X regulation 
 
Table 2 gives some of the details of how RPI-X regulation has evolved in the UK. Each industry has 
a separate price control formula which is set for a number of years (4-5 years). The price control is 
then revised for a further regulatory control period. The price control applies to prices of 
monopolised services and not to services where sufficient competition has emerged (i.e. to inland 
telephone calls, not to telephony equipment). The price control may apply to both the fixed charge 
and the unit charge for a service (e.g. line rental for telephones have a different price cap to 
telephone call charges). In industries where some components of costs are volatile and largely 
outside the control of the regulated company there is provision for pass through of costs (e.g. 
security costs at Airports, costs of purchased power in electricity distribution). RPI-X regulates 
prices but has been augmented with quality regulation which involves fixed penalties for failure to 
meet service standards which are also part of the license conditions of regulated companies (e.g. 
fixed payment to customers if faulty telephone lines are not repaired within two working days). 
 
The evolution of RPI-X since 1984 has led to the emergence of a number of key issues to be decided 
in the regulatory process: 
 
1.  The extent of  the activities which need to be regulated. Price control in telecoms initially 
covered all calls. However in the latest price control period, international calls are effectively no 
longer regulated since it is deemed that there is sufficient competition in this market. By contrast 
in electricity regulation, initially it was assumed that the power pool within which bulk generated 
power is traded would not require regulation. However in 1994/5 and 1995/6 the electricity 
regulator did impose a price cap on the bids that the incumbent generators could offer in the 
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power pool following accusations that they were colluding to raise prices (see Green, 1996, 
p.13). 
 
2.  Setting the value of X in the price cap. Four elements have emerged in setting the price cap. The 
amount of operating expenditure needed by companies to cover ongoing costs of supply 
(OPEX), the amount of capital expenditure which needs to be financed from profits (CAPEX), 
the allowed rate of return on assets and the size of the initial asset base.14 The setting of OPEX 
requires estimation of the likely future cost savings which are possible. The setting of CAPEX 
requires estimation of the investment profile of the companies. The calculation of the allowed rate 
of return requires the assessment of a fair return to the shareholders funds. The size of the initial 
asset base involves an assessment of the opening value of the asset base at the beginning of the 
previous review period plus allowed new investment less depreciation since then. Each of these is 
the subject of detailed analysis by the various regulators. Currently, the water regulator is 
proposing new X (K in water) factors (see OFWAT, 1998). He estimates OPEX by reference to 
past trends in costs and CAPEX by detailed auditing of investment plans and requirements for 
environmental clean up expenditure to be carried out by water companies. The regulator 
calculates the allowed rate of return by adding an equity premium appropriate to companies in 
the risk class of water companies to an estimate of the risk free rate. The initial capital base 
calculated from the initial market value (including debt) of the water companies at privatisation 
plus net capital expenditure since then. Other regulators have used similar analysis in calculating 
allowed prices. 
 
3.  Price rebalancing. An early issue which emerged in British Telecom was the regulation of two-
part tariffs and the extent to which more of the cost the system should be recovered from fixed 
charges rather than call charges. Rebalancing in BT towards loading more of the cost of calls 
onto fixed charges can easily be seen to be economically efficient, given the low marginal costs 
especially of off peak calls, however high line rentals and connection charges raise distributional 
issues such that poor consumers end up paying proportionately more of the cost of the system. A 
related issue is the question of the extent to which BT should have been free to set prices within 
its price basket subject to an average price cap. An average price cap tended to encourage it to 
make predatory price cuts in markets where some competition existed and increase prices in 
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monopoly markets15. Thus domestic call charges rose in the early years relative to international 
calls. International calls have now been removed from the tariff basket. 
 
4.  Access pricing issues. Access prices are the prices which users of a network must pay to the 
network owner. If the network owner competes directly with other users requiring access, such 
as is the case between Mercury and BT over the local telephone network, then the price of access 
needs to be regulated in order to prevent BT charging such high access prices that Mercury is 
effectively denied fair access over BT lines. Baumol and Willig’s efficient component pricing rule 
suggests a solution to the problem of what the allowed price should be16. The key point is that it 
must reflect both the marginal cost of access and the loss of any contribution to fixed cost which 
the loss of a call from BT to Mercury will entail, at lower access charges there may be inefficient 
transfers of calls from the incumbent provider to new entrant when marginal costs are higher for 
the new entrant. Low access charges further result in network owners not being able to earn a 
fair return to the capital invested in their network, if they lose final sales to rivals. 
 
5.  The regulation of quality. The essential issue here is that price cap regulation does not allow 
companies to increase both price and quality, and hence optimal incentives to maintain or 
improve quality do not exist. The issue of the regulation of quality first emerged in 1987 when it 
was reported that 23% of the payphones in the UK were not working at one time. BT had a 
statutory requirement to operate a payphone system even though it made a large loss. However 
there was no requirement to make payphones actually work17. Now all the regulated industries 
have quality regulation, however this is subject to the problem that companies may focus only on 
those measures of quality which the regulator focuses on and not others which customers may 
value.18 
 
6.  The length of the regulatory lag. It is generally accepted that RPI-X and US style rate of return 
regulation mainly differ in the length of the regulatory review period. During the period between 
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price reviews firms can keep any cost savings they can make, or extra profit coming from higher 
than predicted demand for their services. Thus there are strong incentives to reduce short run 
costs and to stimulate demand growth. However capital investments are long lived in all of the 
regulated industries and this means that companies may have returns to investments appropriated 
at the end of the review period. This creates a hold-up problem and this may lead to 
underinvestment by the firms. However the regulator will want to reduce prices in order to pass 
benefits of cost reductions through to customers. There is clearly a trade-off between these two. 
In the UK the regulatory lag has mostly been set at 4-5 years, though the rail train operating 
companies have effectively been given a 7 year lag period. However these lags have been 
associated with battles between regulated companies and their regulators. British Airports 
Authority (BAA) and its regulator, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), disagreed over whether 
BAA has been given enough incentive to go ahead with investment in a 5th passenger terminal at 
Heathrow Airport19. The Train Operating Company, Connex, and the Rail Franchising Director 
disputed over whether to extend the Connex franchise from 7 to 15 years to give the firm the 
incentive to invest in new trains20. 
 
7.  Information disclosure. Theories of optimal regulation (see Baron and Myerson, 1982) stress 
that it is the information asymmetry between the regulator and the regulated firm which makes 
the regulator unable to incentivise the regulated firm in such a way as to maximise social welfare. 
Initially the government was unwilling to burden the companies with onerous information 
disclosure requirements and so the companies were simply encouraged to voluntarily reveal 
information to the regulator. This led to battles between the Gas regulator and British Gas over 
access to documents. Later legislation (e.g. in electricity) has required companies to give all 
information requested to the regulator. However it is still the case that companies can present 
figures on future costs and capital expenditure which exaggerate their revenue requirements in 
future years. The current OFWAT proposal (1998, p.42) on operating cost expenditure is much 
less than the companies project. On the announcement of the proposal, water company share 
prices went up, indicating that market expectations were that these cost projections could be 
easily met by the companies. 
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20 See OPRAF (1998a, p.26). 
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8.  Regulatory discretion. One of the key dangers of regulation is regulatory capture (Stigler, 1971), 
where regulators end up acting on behalf of the companies in order to increase their own welfare 
either through having a quieter life or through a monetary payoff from the company. This does 
not seem to have happened in the UK where prices have been cut very aggressively by regulators 
since privatisation. The regulators have followed different combinations of rules, analysis and 
judgement and some have been judged more successful than others. This emphasises the role of 
discretion in the UK regulatory system, where the Director General is statutorily responsible for 
the regulation. 
 
9.  The role of comparators. The setting of X for an industry depends on estimates of what 
operating and investment costs might be required for a particular monopoly firm. Estimates of 
these can be obtained from analysis of the costs incurred by similar firms. This facilitates 
yardstick regulation (Shleifer, 1985) whereby X can be set with regard to the average efficiency 
of firms within the industry hence giving individual firms better incentives to cut their own costs. 
Comparisons of efficiency are particularly important in setting initial prices at the start of the 
regulatory review period, thus OFWAT (1998) use such analysis to inform how much initial 
prices should fall - less efficient firms being required to reduce prices (and hence costs) by more 
than more efficient firms. Comparators are thus important in econometric and non-parametric 
estimates of cost efficiency and loss of a comparator impacts on the accuracy of the estimated 
cost efficiency. MMC (1994) reported that the value of the loss of one water company by merger 
with another would have a present value of £50-250m. 
 
10. Regulation and investment. We have noted how RPI-X setting involves the regulator taking a 
view about the required investment in the industry. One of the problems in UK regulation is that 
the regulator is increasingly required to take a view on what the best sort of investment in a 
regulated industry is. Companies present business plans suggesting what investments they would 
like to make and it is essentially up to the regulator to decide which plans should be financed. 
This involves the regulator hiring consultants to double-check the companies plans. In railways, 
the rail regulator has had to check that Railtrack is spending its capital budget which it is required 
to do efficiently (ORR, 1998). 
 
3.3 Other Regulatory Issues 
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All of the issues that we discussed in the previous section relate to issues that have arisen with RPI-X 
type regulation. A number of other regulatory issues have arisen since privatisation which the 
industry regulator and the main competition authorities have had to face. These issues are well 
documented in the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) reports that have been published 
since 1984. The MMC adjudicates on disputes between the regulator and the companies. Table 3 
contains the details of these reports for the telecoms, electricity, gas, water and airports industries. 
 
3.3.1 Industry Structure Issues 
 
It was widely recognised at the time of privatisation that British Gas, British Airways and the 
electricity generators were privatised with an unnecessarily large amount of monopoly power. There 
were some suggestions that British Gas should be broken up before privatisation21. It might have 
been possible to do this by the creation of regional distribution companies and a separate supply 
company. Such restructuring might have prevented subsequent allegations that it was using its 
ownership of the gas distribution network to slow the penetration of the gas supply market by 
competitors (MMC, 1993). In 1996 British Gas decided to split in to BG plc, which retained 
ownership of pipes and gas production facilities, and Centrica plc, the gas supply business. British 
Airways operated as the main carrier from its hub at Heathrow Airport operating as a duopolist on 
many international route with control over landing slots. The government has gradually pressured 
British Airways (BA) into giving up slots at Heathrow to facilitate competition with third carriers, 
such as Virgin Atlantic, in return for more favourable treatment of BA’s mergers with other UK 
carriers and its entry into alliances with other overseas airlines. National Power and PowerGen, the 
electricity generators, were privatised with a near duopoly over the price-setting plant in the power 
pool, in spite of studies which have shown the substantial welfare gain to having 5 price setting firms 
(see Green and Newbery, 1992). The electricity regulator has fought a long running battle to force 
these companies to divest large quantities of plant to other firms (see McDaniel, 1998). Each of these 
situations illustrates the importance of getting the structure of the industry right at the time of 
privatisation. 
 
                                                        
21 See Kay and Thompson (1986, p.30). 
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3.3.2 Takeovers and Mergers 
 
The government did privatise several firms within most of the industries we have been examining. 
Initially most of these firms were protected from takeover for a period of 5 years. However once this 
initial period was over and in some cases before, mergers were proposed of horizontal, vertical and 
diversifying types. 
 
Table 3 includes several MMC investigations of horizontal merger proposals in airlines, electricity 
distribution, water supply and airports. In water supply and electricity distribution some horizontal 
mergers have been allowed because the mergers do not involve an increase in monopoly power 
within the individual franchise area and it was felt that the benefits in terms of efficiency savings 
would outweigh the inefficiency from less information on comparative efficiency within the industry. 
In the airports case the MMC felt that there was a sufficient increase in market power in the relevant 
market - air-travel from Northern Ireland - to outweigh any efficiency benefits of integration. 
 
Most of the regulated industries involve firms in vertical relations along a supply chain. Table 3 
reports proposed mergers in telecoms (calls and telephony equipment), electricity (generation and 
distribution and supply). The proposed BT merger with Mitel was approved because BT’s supposed 
inability to exploit the benefits of integration. So it proved, as BT sold Mitel in 1992. In electricity 
the government initially referred the mergers of PowerGen/Midlands Electricity and National 
Power/Southern Electric to the MMC, the Director General having approved them. The MMC 
recommended that mergers be allowed to go ahead subject to conditions but the government decided 
to prevent them (e.g. MMC, 1996a). However recently the government has approved the merger of 
PowerGen with a different regional electricity distribution company, East Midlands Electricity, in 
return for further divestiture of generating plant by PowerGen. 
 
Several of the privatised water and electricity companies have merged to form multi-utilities: Scottish 
Power (Scottish Power-Manweb-Southern Water), Hyder (South Wales Water-SWALEC), and 
United Utilities (North West Water-NORWEB). These mergers have been justified on the grounds 
that they do reduce costs as much of the overhead is shared between the two businesses especially if 
they operate in the same franchise area. Scottish Power is the most aggressive multi-utility offering 
gas, telecoms and electricity within its electricity franchise area in southern Scotland. It has been 
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using its customer base in different parts of the country to offer gas and electricity supply in the 
competitive consumer markets opening up in these industries. The problem with multi-utilities is that 
the costs within a given business of the multi-utility are no longer useable for comparison with non-
multi-utility businesses. Multi-utilities also have distinct market power advantages relative to new 
entrants who cannot offer the range of services that a multi-utility might offer. 
 
In addition to the above issues might be added the issue of foreign ownership of utility assets. Many 
of  the regional electricity distribution companies are now owned by US power companies. Some of 
the water companies are owned by French companies. While there may be little economic issue in 
this, this may raise fears about national security if such assets are controlled by foreign companies. 
 
3.3.3 Abuse of market power 
 
In addition to standard regulatory issues in the limitation of the exercise of monopoly power by 
regulated incumbent firms, accusations have been made with respect to price discrimination, 
predation and collusion, each of which have involved references to the MMC. 
 
British Gas was accused in 1986 of practicing price discrimination between industrial gas customers 
who had access to alternative energy supplies (e.g. electricity for equipment) and those who did not. 
The MMC (1988) found that British Gas had been practicing such price discrimination in violation of 
the Competition Act. Predatory pricing to drive out rivals has been prevalent in the deregulated bus 
industry. Between 1985 and 1994 there were 250 allegations of predatory pricing in the bus industry 
following deregulation and the privatisation of local bus companies (Myers, 1994, p.13). The MMC 
has investigated several cases: a typical case involved the large bus company, Stagecoach in 
predatory pricing in Bognor Regis on certain routes where it was challenged by a new entrant in 
1991-92 (MMC, 1993). Stagecoach introduced new services which targeted the entrant, incurred 
large losses and eventually drove the entrant out of the market. The MMC found Stagecoach had 
engaged in a deliberate anti-competitive practice and ordered it to put up prices on the route. 
Collusion was alleged in the electricity pool (see McDaniel, 1998) and in the airline industry where 
privatised BA sought to enter into alliances with other major carriers. The MMC found that its 
alliance with Sabena was not against the public interest (MMC, 1990), however its latest tie-up with 
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American Airlines has forced British Airways to relinquish further transatlantic landing slots at 
Heathrow. 
 
The recent Competition Act (1998) has strengthened the law on anti-competitive agreements and 
abuse of market power and comes into force on 1 March 2000. The deregulated bus industry is likely 
to particularly feel the effect of stronger powers of investigation, larger penalties, third party rights 
and interim halts to alleged anti-competitive behaviour (see DTI, 1997). 
 
3.4 Conclusion on the regulatory framework 
 
The overall picture that emerges from the above review of regulation of privatised industries is one 
of the high regulatory cost of privatisation. The six major regulatory offices – OFFER, OFTEL, 
OFGAS, OFWAT, OPRAF and ORR - involve direct costs of around £60m per annum in addition to 
the compliance costs within the companies.22 This is a substantial deadweight loss to the economy23. 
In addition there are the indirect costs of the distortions caused by regulatory games between the 
regulator and the companies, regulatory uncertainty and regulatory mistakes. 
 
RPI-X regulation is an evolving form of government control of companies with substantial market 
power, it requires sophisticated implementation, continual adjustment to new market problems and is 
a cumbersome alternative to market competition. However prices have fallen substantially in 
telecoms, gas and electricity, large amounts of capital expenditure have been financed in water and 
airports and there is the prospect of sharp declines in the level government subsidy to the rail industry 
in the medium term as well as large infrastructure improvements. Thus it is difficult to argue that 
RPI-X has not been a flexible and effective form of price control in the UK. 
 
Currently the nature of utilities regulation in the UK is being reviewed (see DTI, 1998). The gas and 
electricity regulatory offices are due to merge (from 1 January 1999 they have the same Director 
General) reflecting the close relationship between the two industries as consumption substitutes and 
                                                        
22 OFFER=The Office of Electricity Regulation, OFTEL=Office of Telecommunications, OFGAS=Office of Gas 
Supply, OFWAT=Office of Water Services, OPRAF=Office of Passenger Rail Franchising, ORR=Office of the Rail 
Regulator. In addition the CAA’s (Civil Aviation Authority) Economic Regulation Group has responsibility (among 
other responsibilities) for airports regulation, the cost of this Group is around £9m p.a. 
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at a time when a growing percentage of electricity is generated by gas. Multi-utilities pose further 
questions about the optimal number of regulatory offices. Meanwhile the government seems to keen 
to reverse the trend towards arms length regulation of utilities by threatening tougher regulation 
unless utilities improve customer service, cut prices and top executive pay. 
 
Section 4: Analysis of the effects of privatisation and deregulation 
 
4.1 Multi-firm studies 
 
The key question raised by the discussion so far is whether privatisation and deregulation has actually 
led to efficiency improvements and if so by how much? In this section we first review a number of 
the major multi-firm studies which have attempted to gauge the overall impact of the programme, 
before going on to focus on the effects of privatisation in 5 specific cases. 
 
The multi-firm studies are summarised in Table 4. It can be seen that a number of different types of 
data have been examined to address the issue of whether privatisation raises economic efficiency. 
Labour productivity and total factor productivity measures are the most popular. Both of these suffer 
from serious shortcomings as measures of economic efficiency. Labour productivity simply focuses 
on the productivity of a single factor while total factor productivity requires assumptions about the 
relative weights of the different factor inputs to be made. In both cases no account is taken of the 
changing nature of output or technology over the period of measurement, so that it is not clear what 
the null hypothesis for the effect of privatisation should be. Neither provide measures of overall 
economic efficiency because they do not provide any information on the price effect of privatisation 
and hence facilitate the comparison of privatisation’s effect on allocative and not just productive 
efficiency. 
 
Hutchinson (1991) tries to test both for the ownership effect on privatisation and the change in 
government effect. It may be that it is not privatisation that causes increased efficiency in those 
companies that were in state ownership in 1979 but the arrival of Mrs Thatcher as Prime Minister. 
He looks at the performance of British Aerospace, Rolls-Royce, Ferranti, Rover, National Freight 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
23 The cost is small in relation to the value added in the industries concerned - electricity, telecoms, gas, water and 
railways - but it should be compared against the deadweight losses of the higher prices which might arise from a 
cheaper form of regulation. 
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Corporation and British Airways. While these firms do seem to underperform before 1979 relative to 
their reference firms their post-1979 performance gives limited evidence for both hypotheses. British 
Airways and NFC outperform their private rivals after 1979 but before privatisation. British 
Aerospace shows no change in its relatively good performance 1970-86 in spite of changes in 
government and ownership (nationalised 1976 and privatised 1981). Rover however shows a relative 
erosion of labour productivity performance throughout the sample period. Overall the results provide 
no evidence for the ownership hypothesis and statistically insignificant support for the ‘Thatcher 
effect’. 
 
Bishop and Thompson (1992) simply compare the labour and total factor productivity growth rates 
over two ten year periods 1970-80 and 1980-90 for a sample of large enterprises that were state 
owned in 1980. The most spectacular improvements come in British Steel and British Coal. Labour 
productivity growth in British Steel rises from -1.7%p.a. to 13.7%p.a. and -2.4%p.a. to 8.1% in 
British Coal. Total factor productivity growth also improves in these firms. The Post Office and 
British Rail also show significant improvements. Interestingly British Telecom, BAA and British 
Airways show falls in total factor productivity growth, though these firms experience slower output 
growth as their industries mature between the periods. 
 
Haskel and Szymanski (1992) attempt to test for the impact on labour productivity growth rates of 
state owned enterprises in their sample by incorporating dummy variables for the introduction of 
competition, and managerial change and ownership change. Competition is modeled via the market 
share of the firm, the coefficient on this variable is negative and strongly significant indicating that 
competition improves labour productivity. A series of management dummy variables for the 
introduction of private sector style management in different firms has mixed results, British Coal and 
British Steel exhibit significant positive coefficients, however none of the other 7 companies 
experiencing managerial change exhibit significant effects. Ownership change dummies are only 
significant for BAA and BA but not British Gas or BT. 
 
Bishop and Green (1995) start from the premise that it was much easier for privatised firms to 
perform well during the growth period of the 1980s and hence set out to examine how well 
privatised companies did during the recessionary period 1990-94. They looked at a number of firms, 
some in competitive markets, others in regulated markets. Of the firms in competitive markets, 
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Amersham, British Airways, Cable and Wireless, Associated British Ports all exhibited 
outperformance of the relevant market index in their share prices over the period 1990-94. Of the 
other competitive firms, British Steel and Rolls Royce were operating in exceptionally difficult global 
market conditions and were generally considered to have performed well in the conditions. The 
remaining competitive firm, Enterprise Oil, was engaged in a failed takeover bid which affected its 
share price performance. Bishop and Green are critical of the performance of the three regulated 
firms they look at  - BT, BAA, and British Gas. Profitability declines sharply over the period and 
total factor productivity grows slowly in BAA and British Gas compared with the Post Office and 
comparably to growth in British Rail and British Coal - generally thought to be poorly performing 
public enterprises. Only British Telecom, under a tighter price-cap and increasing competitive 
pressure, shows significant productivity growth over the period.  
 
Koedijk and Kremers (1996) attempt to explain differential productivity growth in 11 EU countries, 
including the UK, with reference to product market regulation and labour market regulation 
variables. Essentially their technique is to regress average labour productivity growth rates in the 
whole economy over the period 1981-93 on either or both of these variables. The variables are 
simple averages of the rank orders of degree of regulation (1=least, 11=greatest) and hence a 
negative coefficient indicates that less regulation increases productivity growth. The product market 
regulation variable is an unweighted average of similar rankings of ease of business establishment, 
strength of competition policy, degree of public ownership, industry specific support, shop hours and 
progress in the implementation of European single market directives. Koedijk and Kremers estimate a 
coefficient in their product market deregulation only regression of -0.16%. Thus a move from 7 to 1 
on degree of public ownership via mass privatisation in the UK would reduce the average product 
market regulation variable by 1 (given that public ownership is only one of its six determinants) and 
raise productivity growth by 0.16%. This is an extremely crude piece of analysis in that the use of 
rankings and their weightings of the variables are arbitrary. It is also the case that the UK’s 
performance is being compared to that of other countries with similar degrees of deregulation not to 
what it would have done in the absence of deregulation. Also there is no modeling of demand factors 
or other important explanatory factors in productivity growth, such as education. 
 
Parker and Martin (1997, chapter 12) compare the performance of 11 privatised firms. For each firm 
they compare the performance of the firm during the period of nationalisation (as far back as 1973) 
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with four periods: pre-privatisation (between announcement and actual privatisation), immediate post 
privatisation, recession (1990-92) and the latest period (1993-94/95). They compare four sets of 
variables: labour productivity, total factor productivity, value added growth, rate of profit. This gives 
172 potential comparisons. The overall picture is extremely mixed, 82 measures show a rise, 77 a 
fall. Privatisation has positive impact on profits (28 against 12), privatised firms have done better 
recently and in the pre-privatisation period. Jaguar, British Steel, BAA and Rolls Royce show a 
majority of falls. It is not clear what inference can easily be drawn from this as clearly the 
counterfactual - variables should be greater in private than public sector - does not adjust for 
underlying rates of technical progress or demand conditions. 
 
There are two sets of conclusions that can be drawn from the above studies. One set based on the 
overall impact of privatisation, the other on the relative performance of individual firms. 
 
The overall impact. Privatisation itself does not seem to be associated with an acceleration of 
productivity growth or profitability. It seems that management changes within the public sector prior 
to privatisation did however lead to improvements in performance prior to privatisation. Privatisation 
does have a positive impact on financial performance rather than productivity. There is evidence that 
firms in regulated industries exhibit improvements in performance only when regulation is tightened 
or competition increased. 
 
The performance of individual firms. Some privatisations were a clear success: British Airways, 
Cable and Wireless, Amersham International. Some reorganisations prior to privatisation were a clear 
success: British Steel and British Coal. In the regulated industries BT and British Gas perform well in 
absolute terms but not relative to prior to 1980. The privatisations of Jaguar and BAA seem to have 
yielded little benefit. We focus on a number of individual firms and industries more carefully in the 
following sub-section. 
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4.2 Specific case studies 
 
In addition to multi-firm studies a number of papers just focus on one company or industry. We 
examine 5 such cases. Each highlights different aspects of the liberalisation process. 
 
4.2.1 British Airways 
 
British Airways was privatised in 1986 and since been a very successful international airline with a 
hub based around London’s Heathrow airport. The transformation of BA began in 1979 with the 
announcement of the government’s intention to privatise the company. John, later Lord, King 
became chairman in 1981 and Colin Marshall became chief executive in 1983. These two are credited 
with a radical transformation in BA’s productivity and performance prior to privatisation, with staff 
numbers falling by 30% between 1979-86 (see Litwin et al., 1996). Martin and Parker (1997, p.205-
6) note that performance since 1986 has been mixed. Vogelsang and Green (1994), using social cost 
benefit analysis, calculated net gains to society of the privatisation of £680m of which £770m goes to 
shareholders, £315m to the government while customers lose by £325m and competitors lose by 
£85m (1987 prices). 
 
BA’s privatisation has raised competition issues. The government’s Civil Aviation Authority (see 
Baldwin, 1990) noted that BA had a dominant position in UK civil aviation prior to privatisation. It 
was recognised that there was a tradeoff between BA’s strength as an international airline and 
competitiveness in the internal market. The government was largely sympathetic to BA and did not 
propose any radical restructuring prior to privatisation. Quite the reverse was apparent when BA was 
allowed to take over its major domestic rival British Caledonian in 1987. As part of the conditions of 
that merger BA had to relinquish 5000 landing slots at Heathrow but its domestic market power was 
increased. Since then BA has been under pressure to reduce its slots at Heathrow to facilitate further 
competition notably from Virgin Atlantic (see Jones and Pollitt, 1995). Baldwin (1990) considered 
the regulatory regime to have been too lax with respect to BA. The BA privatisation suggests the 
potential for privatising a firm in a competitive industry but also the regulatory problems arising from 
the privatisation of firms with significant market power. 
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4.2.2 British Telecom 
 
The privatisation of British Telecom appears to have been a success on many measures, prices have 
fallen significantly, while productivity and profits have risen. Pitt (1990) suggests that privatisation 
transformed BT’s corporate culture, internal organisation, strategy, and industrial relations in ways 
that facilitated more rapid growth and productivity improvement. Indeed Vogelsang et al. (1994) 
conduct a social cost benefit analysis of the privatisation of British Telecom which quantifies these 
positive effects. Society gains £10bn (of which £1bn accrues to foreign shareholders). Of this total 
£3.7bn goes  to shareholders, £2.25bn to the government and consumers gain £4.15bn. 
 
Vogelsang et al. note that the productivity improvement results from technological improvement and 
not privatisation per se, though privatisation does lift the investment constraint imposed by the 
Treasury and hence facilitates a large increase in fixed capital formation. The price effects are 
enforced by regulation. The privatisation thus reveals the importance of privatisation in encouraging 
investment and the role of regulation in passing efficiency gains in natural monopolies on to 
customers. Privatisation does not appear to have improved operating efficiency sharply until 1991 
when downsizing of labour force began to accelerate, under pressure of competition. Before then 
rapid productivity growth is largely a function of output growth, which is partly related to falling 
prices. 
 
Prior to privatisation the government licensed another network competitor, Mercury, and began a 
‘duopoly policy’ in telecoms with the aim of developing an alternative national network (see Beesley 
and Laidlaw, 1995). This was to provide the competition that would eventually render the regulation 
of BT unnecessary. Initially competition from Mercury was ineffective as the interconnection 
agreement between BT and Mercury was unfavourable to Mercury. After 1987 Mercury did begin to 
emerge as a serious competitor to BT in some areas but BT’s market share was eroded only slowly. 
1990-91 saw a review of the duopoly policy and the end of the policy with alternative licenses being 
offered. Cable and mobile phone companies can now offer fixed link telecommunications services in 
direct competition to BT. This has resulted in much more competition since then, such that 
effectively only BT’s inland phone charges are now regulated. Competition is now seen as the 
primary means of improving services and prices in telecommunications. 
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4.2.3 British Gas 
 
Price and Weyman-Jones (1996) find that productivity growth accelerates around the time of 
privatisation, comparing 1977-8 through to 1990-1. This acceleration in productivity seems to begin 
around 1983 at the time when the government tightened its financial control of British Gas. British 
Gas however has only begun to rapidly reduce its headcount in recent years during which time it has 
faced sustained criticism of the pay rises of its chief executive24 and its quality of service record25. 
 
The decision to privatise British Gas as a natural monopoly and the requirement on the regulator to 
promote competition has lead to difficult relations between the company and its regulator, OFGAS. 
As Table 3 shows there have been a number of references to the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission. In 1988 the company was held to be abusing its monopoly power in the unregulated 
industrial gas market by charging higher prices to customers with alternative sources of supply. This 
practice had been occurring before privatisation but privatisation made it possible to intervene to 
prevent it (Price, 1994). In 1991 price regulation was tightened and some requirement to achieve 
efficiency gains in gas purchase was introduced. British Gas was then required to lose 60% of the 
contract gas market by 1995 but negotiations on this became deadlocked and the company was again 
referred to the MMC which reported in 1993.  The MMC (1993b) recommended the separation of 
the company into a supply business and a transportation and storage business. The government 
rejected these proposals but did announced the rapid introduction of full supply competition by 1998. 
In February 1997 the company voluntarily demerged into Centrica (the supply business) and BG 
Transco (the transportation business). Waddams-Price (1998) sees the development of competition 
as a triumph of regulatory determination against the odds: in spite of the uncompetitive market 
structure set at the time of privatisation the regulators have managed to introduce substantial 
amounts of competition into the market. 
 
Competition has resulted in a rapid loss of market share for British Gas from 91% to 29% of the 
industrial market (1991-1996). Full supply competition has resulted in significant price reductions for 
residential customers who do switch but relatively little switching of suppliers (Hancock and 
Waddams-Price, 1998). While prices have fallen for most consumers, a small group of high cost, low 
                                                        
24 See Lewis, W., ‘Gesture to the boardroom’, Financial Times, 26 May 1995, p.17. 
25 See Corzine, R., ‘British Gas complaints up 94%’, Financial Times, 17 February 1995, p.11. 
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usage residential consumers will face higher relative prices as a result of competition leading to 
increased price discrimination. 
 
4.2.4 The Water Industry 
 
Lynk (1993) examined the efficiency of 28 statutory private water supply companies and the 10 
regional water and sewerage companies (WASCs) over the period 1979-80 to 1987-88. He used 
stochastic frontier analysis to calculate the relative inefficiency of the public and private water 
companies. He found that the publicly owned companies were less inefficient on average than the 
private water companies. This provided evidence against the argument that privatisation in water 
supply will improve cost efficiency. 
 
The 10 WASCs were privatised in 1989 as natural monopolies. It was envisaged that product market 
competition might develop via contracting for bulk supply from existing companies, common 
carriage via a national water grid, cross border competition at the boundaries of water companies 
franchise areas. Cowan (1994) concludes that none of these routes to competition is likely to be 
significant factor in the development of the industry. The regulator has therefore concentrated on 
introducing yardstick regulation of water companies in the absence of competitive pressure. There 
seems to be accumulating evidence that the cost efficiency of water companies has improved 
significantly since privatisation under the pressure of yardstick regulation and the capital market 
pressure operating through the introduction of more efficient management techniques combined with 
takeover pressure. 
 
A major problem with water regulation is that residential pricing has traditionally been based on the 
rateable value of the house of the customer not on the usage (see Cowan, 1998). This makes the 
introduction of economically efficient prices for water difficult while reducing the distributional 
problems which would be caused by moving to use based charges. Metering is expensive for small 
customers and is not widespread. The water industry has also been loaded with environmental 
responsibilities for investments in water and beach quality. These financial requirements are onerous 
and represent a tax on water customers to pay for public goods. The regulator has clearly separated 
the contribution to prices associated with economic regulation from those associated with 
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environmental regulation in his latest price review proposals, leaving it to the government to decide 
what level of environmental taxes to levy from the water industry. 
 
4.2.5 The Rail Industry 
 
The privatisation of the rail industry was arguably the most complex privatisation (see Bradshaw, 
1998, Kain, 1998 and Joy, 1998). It occurred in response to a 1991 EC Directive which called on 
member states to introduce open access rights to enable third-party operators to access the EC rail 
system. In response to this the government separated British Rail, the state owned rail company, into 
more than 100 other companies which were transferred to private ownership. Railtrack, the railway 
infrastructure company, was floated on the stock market in 1996. BR’s infrastructure support 
departments and other central services were sold off by tender. BR’s rolling stock was sold by tender 
as three rolling stock leasing companies (ROSCOs). BR’s freight train operations were sold by 
tender as 6 companies. Finally passenger train operations were franchised to 25 Train Operating 
Companies (TOCs).  
 
The regulation of these companies is via the Office of the Rail Regulator who regulates Railtrack’s 
access charges for use of the network, ensures coordination between the companies on timetables, 
information and ticketing, and regulates Railtrack’s investment plans. The 25 TOCs are overseen by 
the Rail Franchising Director which draws up franchise agreements, including the degree of subsidy 
each TOC gets. Franchises are for period of 7 to 15 years and incorporate declining annual subsidies 
over their lifetime such that subsidies fall from £2037m in 1996/7 to £729m in 2003/4 (Kain, 98. 
p.257). 
 
Kain (1998) identifies a number of emerging features of the industry. First, pressure to consolidate 
ownership. In 1998 9 companies and 4 consortia own TOC franchises while one company owning a 
TOC has acquired a ROSCO. There is likely to be further pressure to reintegrate the industry. 
Second, private ownership has created incentives for new investment in new trains, new routes and in 
rail freight. Third, open access is to be introduced and is likely to emerge on some routes. Fourth, 
performance monitoring is extremely important. Recent regulatory pressure, including fines, 
encouraged the TOCs to improve performance in the operation of national rail telephone enquires 
centre. Fifth, network integration does have significant benefits and is necessary if safety standards 
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are to be maintained. Sixth, regulators are extremely powerful in an industry where much monopoly 
power remains. Standards of service have declined recently26 and the regulator is likely to be 
significant in any attempt to improve service which is hampered by coordination problems between 
TOCs (one company’s engine failure reduces the efficiency of another using the same track). 
Regulation needs to ensure sufficient investment in infrastructure and rolling stock. Short franchise 
periods do not ensure adequate incentives to invest and some TOCs have been engaged in franchise 
renegotiation in order to encourage new investment. The government has recently proposed the 
creation of a Strategic Rail Authority to promote and oversee the activities of the rail industry.27 
 
Section 5: Conclusions 
 
Both Oulton (1995, p.59) and Crafts (1998, p.29) cite privatisation as an important component of the 
improvement of the supply side of the UK economy which they observe since 1979. In that narrow 
sense privatisation has contributed to the improved macroeconomic performance of the UK economy 
noted over the period. 
 
An economic assessment of the effects of the deregulation and privatisation of public enterprises in 
the UK would focus on five groups within society and how privatisation has affected them: 
consumers, shareholders, workers, the government and competitor firms. We conclude that 
privatisation has generally improved consumer welfare via a combination of higher quality and 
quantity of output and lower prices. The improving technology of regulation has undoubtedly 
facilitated this. Shareholders have benefited via windfall gains. Workers do not seem to have got 
lower salaries as a result of privatisation if they remained with the company while those who left 
were re-employed elsewhere in the economy (unemployment fell from 1986) or went to early 
retirement. The government gained large asset sales and increased profits taxes. Competitor firms 
gained almost by definition in all but a few industries as entry barriers were removed. 
 
The lessons from UK privatisation are contained in the detail of the previous sections. They have 
resulted in a long list of current debates in the regulation and market structure of privatised industries 
and a substantial list of improvements that could have made in the process of privatisation in order to 
deliver even bigger benefits from privatisation. 
                                                        
26 See OPRAF (1998b). 
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Finally, it is interesting to return to the benefits of privatisation suggested by Marsh (1991) and 
Moore (1992) in order to evaluate the success of the programme in its own terms and raise caveats 
about the extent of that success. 
 
1.  Reduced government involvement in industry. While privatisation has seen reduced government 
ownership of industry, the need for regulation via regulatory bodies such as OFTEL (Office of 
Telecommunications) ensures continuing government involvement in industry. 
 
2.  Increased efficiency. Privatisation and regulation have secured efficiency gains via a combination 
of market incentives and tough regulation. However if RPI-X regulation evolves into rate of 
return regulation over time there may be inefficiencies which result from privatisation. 
 
3.  Reduced public sector borrowing requirement. This has undoubtedly happened in the short run 
via asset sales, higher corporation tax and debt repayment. If these efficiency improvements could 
have been secured in the public sector even larger revenue streams (measured in net present 
value) might still be available to the government. There is also little doubt that the government 
did not get as high a price for its assets as was subsequently justified. 
 
4.  Curbing public sector union power. It is not clear the extent to which privatisation, apart from 
the government’s other policies to reduce trade union power, contributed to the ‘improvement’ in 
industrial relations noted by Oulton (1995). 
 
5.  Wider share ownership and employee share ownership. Privatisation has increased the number of 
small shareholders but the economic significance of this is surely negligible. 
 
6.  Gaining political advantage. Perhaps this is the most significant aspect of the UK privatisation 
programme - the fact that privatisation was the most sustained and consistent policy of the 1979-
97 Conservative administration. It undoubtedly gained advantage for those in favour of a free 
market approach to competition but was ultimately so intellectually successful that all political 
parties have at least acquiesced to it. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
27 See DETR (1998). 
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Table 1 
Privatisations via Public Offer of Shares, 1979-96 
 
 Date of Offer % sold Govt 
         £m 
British Petroleum October 1979 
September 1983 
November 1987 
5.2 
7.2 
36.8 
290 
566 
5370 
British Aerospace February 1981 
May 1985 
51.6 
59.0 
50  
363 
Cable & Wireless October 1981 
December 1983 
December 1985 
49.4 
22.3 
31.1 
189 
275 
602 
Britoil November 1982 
August 1985 
51.0 
49.0 
641 
449 
Amersham International February 1982 100.0 65 
Associated British Port Holdings February 1983 
April 1984 
51.5 
48.5 
-34 
52 
Enterprise Oil July 1984 100.0 392 
Jaguar August 1984 100.0 0 
British Telecommunications December 1984 
December 1991 
July 1993 
50.2 
25.9 
20.7 
2626 
5240 
5335 
British Gas December 1986 96.6 7720 
British Airways February 1987 97.5 900 
Rolls-Royce May 1987 96.7 1080 
BAA July 1987 95.6 1281 
British Steel December 1988 100.0 2425 
Anglian Water December 1989 98.4 768 
Northumbrian Water December 1989 98.4 34 
North West Water December 1989 98.4 524 
Severn Trent December 1989 98.4 488 
Southern Water December 1989 98.4 347 
South West Water December 1989 97.4 27 
Thames Water December 1989 97.4 934 
Welsh Water December 1989 98.4 70 
Wessex Water December 1989 98.4 165 
Yorkshire Water December 1989 97.8 383 
Eastern Electricity December 1990 97.6 647 
East Midlands Electricity December 1990 97.5 523 
London Electricity December 1990 97.5 523 
Manweb December 1990 97.5 285 
Midlands Electricity December 1990 97.7 502 
Northern Electric December 1990 97.5 295 
NORWEB December 1990 98.4 414 
SEEBOARD December 1990 97.5 305 
Southern Electric December 1990 97.5 647 
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South Wales Electricity December 1990 97.5 243 
South Western Electricity December 1990 97.0 295 
Yorkshire Electricity December 1990 97.5 497 
Regional Electricity December 1990            –  7907 
National Power March 1991 
March 1995 
60.9 
38.3 
a 
a 
PowerGen March 1991 
March 1995 
59.5 
36.6 
a 
a 
National Power/PowerGen March 1991            –  2954 
National Power/PowerGen March 1995            –  3594 
Scottish Hydro-Electric June 1991 96.6 a 
Scottish Power June 1991 96.4 a 
Scottish Hydro-Electric/Power June 1991            –  3481 
Northern Ireland Electricity June 1993 96.5 362 
Railtrack May 1996 98.0 1950 
British Energy July 1996 87.8 2108 
    
 
TOTAL   61 973 
 
Adapted from: Curwen, P. and Hartley, K. (1997) and Price Waterhouse (1990). 
 
Includes debt repayment in case of Britoil (1982). 
Net of extinguishing debt prior to sale in case of Associated British Ports (1983) and BT (1984). 
Includes debt issue in case of British Gas, Anglian Water, Thames Water, Regional Electricity, National 
Power/PowerGen (1991), Scottish Hydro-Electric/Power and British Energy. 
a=Breakdowns not provided. 
 
Table 2 
RPI – X Regulation 
 
  
 
British 
Telecom1 
 
 
British Gas 
 
British Airports 
Authority2 
 
Water Supply 
Companies 
 
Electricity 
Transmission 
(NGC) 
 
Electricity 
Distribution 
(RECs)3 
 
Railtrack4 
 
Train 
Operating 
Companies5 
 
Regulated 
 
Inland calls 
International 
calls (From 
1991) 
Line rentals 
Leased Lines 
 
 
Supply to small 
users 
Transportation 
and storage of 
gas (from 
1994)6 
 
Airport charges 
at south-east 
airports  
 
Water and 
sewerage 
charges 
Trade effluent 
Infrastructure 
charge 
 
All 
transmission 
 
All 
distribution 
 
All access to 
track, stations 
and light 
maintenance 
depots 
 
‘Saver’7, 
‘Weekly 
Season’ and 
most 
commuter 
fares around 
London, 
Edinburgh, 
Manchester 
and Cardiff 
 
Unregulat
ed 
 
Apparatus 
supply 
Mobile services 
VANS 
 
 
Supply to larger 
users 
 
All other 
services (retail, 
parking etc.) 
 
All other 
activities (but 
Ofwat monitors 
diversification) 
 Extra high 
voltage 
distribution, 
contracting 
Non-rail 
property 
income 
Apex and 
discount fares 
 
Price 
index 
 
Tariff basket 
based on that of 
smallest 80% of 
Average 
revenue per 
therm 
Average 
revenue per 
passenger 
Tariff basket 
(modified) 
Average 
revenue per 
KWh 
Average 
revenue per 
KWh 
Fixed track 
access charge 
for service, 
station long 
Individual 
fare 
                                               
1 See OFTEL (1996). 
2 See MMC (1996b). 
3 Electricity supply business regulation is being phased out with the coming of full competition in electricity supply (see McDaniel, this 
volume). 
4 See ORR (1997). 
5 See Bradshaw (1998). 
6 Updated from CRI (1996) The UK Regulated Industries: Financial Facts 1994/95; Appendix B.2. 
residential users term charge 
 
X (or K) 
values 
 
X = 3 (1984-89) 
X = 4.5 (1989-
91) 
X = 6.25 (1991-
93) 
X = 7.5 (1993-
97) 
X = 4.5 (1997-
2001)8 
 
 
X = 2 (1987-92) 
X = 5 (1992-94) 
X = 4 (1994-97) 
 
X = 5 (1994-97) 
for 
transportation9 
X = 2 (1997-)10 
 
X = 1 (1987-92) 
X = 8, 8, 4, 1, 1 
(1992-97) 
X=3 (Heathrow 
and Gatwick) 
(1997-2002) 
X=-1 (Stansted, 
1997-2002) 
 
 
K varies by firm 
over 1995-2000 
the range is +4 
to -211 
 
X = 0 (1990-
93) 
X = 3 (1993-
97) 
X = 4 (1997-
2001)12 
 
Each REC 
has its X : 
range is from 
RPI + 0 to 
RPI + 2.5 
 
X = 8 
(1995/6) 
X = 2 
1996/7-
2000/1) 
 
X=0 (1996-
98) 
X=1 (1999-
2002) 
In commuter 
markets: 
X=-2 to 2 
depending on 
quality 
improvement
s 
 
Price 
structure 
 
Initially sub-
price caps on 
line rental and 
median user bill 
 
 
X = 0 cap on 
fixed charge for 
<5K therms 
    91%=fixed 
charge 
9%=variable 
charge 
 
 
Cost pass-
through 
 All gas supply 
costs (1987-92) 
GPI – 1 
(1992 - )  
energy 
efficiency factor 
75% of extra 
security costs 
(1987-92) 
95% of extra 
security costs 
(1992-) 
Cost of new 
environmental 
and quality 
regulations 
  Traction 
electricity 
charge 
 
 
Quality 
Regulatio
n 
 
Fixed 
compensation 
for delays in 
repairs and 
connections. 
Contractual 
 
Compensation 
scheme 
  
EC and UK 
standards for 
drinking water 
and bathing 
beaches 
Levels of 
  
Fixed 
penalties for 
performance 
failures 
(capacity 
element in 
 
Fines for 
failure to 
meet targets 
on delays and 
cancellations 
and on 
 
Fines for 
failure to 
meet 
performance 
targets plus 
rewards for 
                                               
8 Updated from Martin & Parker (1997). 
9 CRI, op. cit. Appendix B.2. 
10 From the MMC report published in June, 1997. 
11 CRI (1996), Appendix B.4 contains data on K factors in water companies. 
12 Updated from the web-site of Offer: www.open.gov.uk/offer/offerhm.htm. 
13 There are three main incentive schemes: the Punctuality Incentive Payment (PIP) which sets fines for delays and cancellations but 
liability service 
monitored 
Compensation 
scheme 
 
pool price 
promotes 
supply 
security) 
improvement 
of network 
(stewardship 
objectives) 
achievements
13 
 
Regulator
y Lag 
 
Initially 5 years 
Now 4 years 
Next review 
2001 
 
 
5 years 
 
 
5 years 
Next review 
2002 
MMC involved 
 
10 years (2000)  
5 years at 
Ofwat’s or 
firm’s request 
Next review 
2000 
 
Initially 3 
years 
Now 4 years 
Next review 
2001 
 
5 years 
Next review 
200014 
 
Initially 6 
years, Next 
review will 
be for 5 years 
 
Initially 7 
years, Next 
review 2003 
Adapted from  Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994), pp.176-177. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
capacity requirements for commuters; and the Timetable Change Incentive Payment (TCIP) which sets fines for unpublicised timetable 
changes (see OPRAF, 1998a). 
Table 3 
MMC Investigations in Gas, Electricity, Water, Telecoms, Airports and Airlines 
1980-1997 
 
Company Date of reporting15 Reason for reference 
 
MMC recommendation16 
Central Electricity Generating Board  20 May 1981 An investigation into  the efficiency and costs of the CEGB’s system 
for the generation and supply of electricity in bulk. 
MMC made recommendations intended to enhance 
efficiency, esp. investment in nuclear power. 
Severn-Trent Water Authority, East 
Worcestershire Waterworks Company and the 
South Staffordshire Waterworks Company  
9 June 1981 An investigation into the efficiency and costs of the STWA, and in 
relation to the supply of water, of the two waterworks companies. 
MMC made recommendations on manpower, investment, 
budget-setting and internal organisation. 
Anglian Water Authority and North West 
Water Authority 
8 November 1982 An investigation into the efficiency and costs of the sewerage 
functions of the two Authorities. 
MMC made recommendations on internal organisation, 
capital prioritising and strategic planning. 
London Electricity Board 3 March 1983 The DGFT  believed that the LEB was engaged in anti-competitive 
practices in its business of domestic electrical goods, spare parts and 
ancillary goods. 
MMC concluded that LEB has been pursuing an anti-
competitive practice by the cross-subsidisation of its 
domestic goods business out of the profits made from 
electricity supply; however, other electricity boards also 
pursue this practice. 
Yorkshire Electricity Board 7 August 1983 An investigation into the efficiency and costs of the Board. MMC made recommendations on YEB strategy, 
objectives and management structure. 
Civil Aviation Authority 9 October 1983 An investigation into the efficiency and costs of the supplying by the 
CAA of navigation and air traffic control services to civil aircraft. 
MMC made recommendations on financial control, 
investment, strategy and project management. 
South Wales Electricity Board 29 February 1984 An investigation into the efficiency and costs of the Board. SWALEB’s charges were found to be high relative to 
other Boards, and efficiency-enhancing recommendations 
were made. 
Yorkshire Water Authority 5 December 1984 An investigation into the efficiency and costs of, and the service 
provided by the YWA. 
MMC made recommendations on internal processes, 
management structure and manpower issues. 
Four Area Electricity Boards 30 January 1985 An investigation into the efficiency of revenue collection by East 
Midlands, South Eastern, North Eastern and South Western. 
Recommendations made but none of the four found to be 
pursuing a course of action which operates against the 
public interest. 
North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board 2 October 1985 An investigation into the efficiency and costs of the Board. There was substantial scope for improvement in the 
setting of objectives, the use of information, and in the co-
ordination of central and local planning processes. 
British Airports Authority 10 October 1985 An investigation into the efficiency and costs of, and the service 
provided by BAA in its commercial activities. 
MMC made recommendations intended to increase 
competition in airport terminals, and to improve 
efficiency in other areas. 
British Telecommunications plc  27 January 1986 An investigation of the proposed merger between BT and Mitel 
Corporation. 
The merger was approved, subject to conditions  requiring 
BT to keep its UK business separate from that of Mitel. 
Southern Water Authority, The Eastbourne 
Waterworks Company, Folkestone and 
District Water Company, Mid-Sussex Water 
Company, Portsmouth Water Company and 
West Kent Water Company 
16 April 1986 An investigation into the efficiency and costs of, and the service 
provided by the Authority and the companies in the supply and 
distribution of water. 
Recommendations intended to enhance efficiency were 
made to the SWA and the companies. 
South of Scotland Electricity Board 20 August 1986 An investigation into the efficiency and costs of the Board. Made recommendations regarding management structure, 
efficiency audits, objectives and fuel inputs. 
                                               
15 The date given is the date of the report’s publication, not the date of referral to the MMC. 
16 The ‘result’ is the recommendation of the MMC, which may differ from the events that actually ensued. 
CEGB 25 June 1987 An investigation into  the efficiency and costs of the CEGB’s system 
for the transmission of electricity in bulk. 
MMC made recommendations on financial controls, 
monitoring of managerial performance, and other issues, 
e.g. investment and budgets. 
British Airways plc 11 November 1987 An investigation of the proposed merger between BA and British 
Caledonian – was referred to the MMC on grounds of reduced 
competition and market dominance. 
MMC approved the merger, since BA had agreed to give 
up 5000 landing slots at Gatwick, B.Cal’s base, and to 
surrender several of B.Cal’s European routes. 
Manchester Airport 22 December 1987 An investigation into the allowed price regulation of MA and 
whether MA was acting against public interest. 
RPI-1 recommended for five years. 
Welsh Water Authority 18 May 1988 An investigation of the WWA’s efficiency, costs and service. MMC concluded that WWA would be able to achieve its 
cost reduction targets by March 1990. 
British Gas 19 October 1988 BG was referred to the MMC due to alleged price discrimination in 
the unregulated contract market. 
MMC concluded that monopoly power was present, and 
was being abused. Recommendations included the 
publication of non-negotiable price schedules in the 
contract market. 
General Utilities plc, The Colne Valley Water 
Company and Rickmansworth Water 
Company. 
27 April 1990 An investigation of the proposed merger between the three 
companies; GU (owned by the French company CGE) controlled 
The Lee Valley Water Company – the proposed merger was referred 
to the MMC, since the combined company would cover a significant 
amount of north-west London. 
MMC found that the merger was against the public 
interest, since it would reduce the scope for yardstick 
competition; however, it could be allowed if the claimed 
gains from merger were passed back to consumers as 
lower prices. 
General Utilities plc and the Mid Kent Water 
Company 
4 July 1990 An investigation of the merger situation. MMC recommended that the number of comparators for 
yardstick competition be maintained by not allowing CGE 
to have board representation at Mid Kent Water. 
Southern Water plc and Mid-Sussex Water 
Company 
4 July 1990 An investigation of the merger situation MMC concluded that the merger was not against the 
public interest, since the Mid-Sussex Water Company was 
already controlled by the French firm SAUR. 
CAA 18 July 1990 An investigation into the supply of navigation and air traffic control 
services to civil aircraft. 
MMC made recommendations for improving strategic and 
manpower planning, the management of investment and 
operating efficiency. 
BA and Sabena SA 25 July 1990 BA and KLM entered into an agreement in which they would each 
invest about £35m in Sabena World Airlines, a subsidiary of Sabena 
SA. The arrangement aimed to develop a hub and spoke operation at 
Brussels. 
MMC concluded that the arrangements were not against 
the public interest. 
BAA 9 July 1991 An investigation into the allowed price regulation of BAA and 
whether BAA was acting against public interest. 
Price control equal to RPI-8 for first two years, then RPI-
4 in third year and RPI-1 in years 4 and 5. 
Manchester Airport 9 July 1992 An investigation into the allowed price regulation of MA and 
whether MA was acting against public interest. 
MMC recommends RPI-3 for 1993-98 period. 
British Gas 17 August 1993 
and 6 September 
1993 
BG requests reference to MMC of whole business. MMC recommends breakup of BG into supply and 
transportation businesses, complete abolition of supply 
monopoly, lower rate of return on transportation and 
storage assets and relaxation of X from 5 to 4 for small 
customers from 1994. 
Scottish Hydro-Electric plc. 15 June 1995 DGES makes reference after SHE rejects proposals on pricing. MMC found against company and recommended price 
reductions, though not as much as regulator. 
Portsmouth Water plc 28 July 1995 The DGWS referred the determination of the adjustment (K) factor 
and the standard infrastructure charge to the MMC. 
MMC set an adjustment factor of –1.5 for 1995-2000, and 
of –0.5 for 2000-2005. Also determined infrastructure 
charge of £200. 
South West Water plc 28 July 1995 The DGWS referred the determination of the adjustment (K) factor 
and the standard infrastructure charge to the MMC. 
MMC set an adjustment factor of +1.0 for 1995-2000, and 
of 0.0 for 2000-2005. Also determined infrastructure 
charge of £200. 
BT 14 December 1995 After BT failed to reach agreement with Videotron on the financial 
terms of telephone portability, Oftel referred the issue to the MMC.  
MMC concluded that the lack of portability was against 
the public interest; its negative effects could be remedied 
by modifications to BT’s licence. 
Belfast International Airport Ltd. And Belfast 
City Airport Ltd. 
9 January 1996 Investigation of the proposed merger between the two airports; 
referred to the MMC by the DTI . 
MMC concluded that the potential benefits from the 
merger are outweighed by the detrimental effects on 
competition and choice; the MMC recommended that the 
merger be prohibited. 
PowerGen plc and Midlands Electricity plc  25 April 1996 Investigation of the proposed merger; referred to the MMC on 
grounds of vertical integration between a generator and REC. 
MMC concluded that the merger was acceptable, provided 
certain conditions are met. One member of the inquiry 
group dissented with the conclusions.  
National Power plc and Southern Electric plc 25 April 1996 As PowerGen – Midlands report. As PowerGen – Midlands report. 
BAA 16 July 1996 An investigation into the allowed price regulation of BAA’s London 
airports and whether BAA was acting against public interest. 
MMC recommends RPI-3 for 1997-2002 at Heathrow and 
Gatwick, RPI+1 at Stansted. Some of BAA’s action ruled 
to be against public interest. 
Severn Trent plc and South West Water plc  25 October 1996 An investigation of the proposed merger between two WSCs. MMC recommended that the merger be prohibited on the 
grounds that it would result in the loss of SWWS as a 
comparator. 
Wessex Water plc and South West Water plc 25 October 1996 As Severn Trent – SW Water report. As Severn Trent – SW Water report. 
Mid Kent Holdings plc and General Utilities 
plc and SAUR Water Services plc 
21 January 1997 An investigation of the proposed merger – GU and SAUR had 
launched a hostile joint bid for MKH, a small water-only company. 
MMC concluded that the potential efficiency gains 
through the merger are small, whereas the loss of 
comparative competition are large; it recommended that 
the merger be prohibited. 
British Gas plc 18 June 1997 BG was referred to the MMC after a dispute with the DGWS 
concerning the price cap for BG Transco’s transportation and storage 
services. 
MMC’s conclusions broadly supported the DGWS; a 
price cap of RPI – 2 was imposed. 
NI Electricity 25 April 1997 Reference made by DGES for NI after NIE rejected price control 
proposals. 
MMC recommends price reductions less than DGES NI 
had wanted by greater than those sought by NIE. 
Manchester Airport 19 August 1997 Investigation into appropriate economic regulation of charges. RPI-6.5 in 1998-99, with RPI-5 for subsequent 4 years 
and found that process of consultation inadequate. 
Pacificorp and The Energy Group plc  19 December 1997 The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry referred the proposed 
merger between these two companies on the grounds of foreign 
ownership of a REC. 
The MMC concluded that the merger is not expected to 
act against the public interest. 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 4 
Multi-firm studies of the effects of privatisation in the UK. 
Study 
 
Objective Method Data Results 
Hutchinson 
(1991) 
To test whether private firms are more 
efficient than government owned firms 
and whether change of government in 
1979 had a positive effect on corporate 
performance. 
Descriptive statistics and OLS analysis 
of labour productivity, profitability, 
technology mix. 
17 UK firms, 1970-86, including 
6 privatised firms in competitive 
industries. 
Private firms more efficient than public firms, 
but public outperform over period, weak 
evidence for government effect but no clear 
ownership effect. 
Bishop and Thompson 
(1992) 
To test the extent to which the efficiency 
improvements are being achieved 
through privatisation in the UK. 
Output, labour productivity and total 
factor productivity growth rates. 
9 UK public enterprises 1970-90. Average labour and total factor productivity 
growth increases for the sample between 1970-80 
and 1980-90 periods. 
Haskel and Szymanski  
(1992) 
To test four hypotheses concerning the 
effect of ownership and competition on 
efficiency in the UK. 
Labour Productivity growth regressions. 1972-1988 data on 12 UK initially 
public companies restructured or 
privatised during period. 
Competition increases productivity, changes in 
ownership, management and regulation have 
slight impact. Productivity improvement due to 
labour shedding. 
Bishop and Green 
(1995) 
To examine how well privatised 
companies did in the recession period 
1990-94. 
Profit, turnover, wages and employment 
data. 
9 companies 1979-1994, 
including BT, British Gas and 
BAA. TFP growth comparison 
1990-94 for these 3 regulated 
companies and British Coal, 
British Gas and BT. 
Firms in competitive industries do better than 
those in regulated industries. TFP comparison 
reveals no better performance in private than 
private sector. 
Koedijk and Kremers 
(1996) 
To estimate the effect of the degree of 
product market and labour market 
regulation on real output growth. 
Regression of real output growth in 
market sector per capita on measures of 
degree of regulation. 
Data on 11 EU countries for the 
period 1981-93. 
Change in public ownership rank variable from 
7 to 1 in UK would increase growth by 
0.16%p.a. relative to other countries. Overall 
product market deregulation may raise UK 
growth by 0.6%p.a.* 
Parker and Martin 
(1997) 
To estimate the significance of the 
performance impact of privatisation. 
Labour productivity, total factor 
productivity, growth of value-added per 
employee and rate of profit. 
11 privatised organisations over 
1973-95 period. 
No overall improvement in productivity growth 
as a result of privatisation. Degree of 
competition clearly explains differential effect 
of privatisation. 
For further sources see Parker and Martin (1997, pp.85-86). * See Crafts (1998, p.29). 
 
